The system of wage setting in the Nordic countries is often regarded as highly centralised, contributing to considerable real wage flexibility. This view has been questioned, as sizeable wage drift may offset the effect of central negotiations. This paper presents evidence from the four major Nordic countries, suggesting that there is little or no such offsetting effect. Yet, at central negotiations, the institutional system of wage formation may induce nominal rigidities that may prevent wage restraint when there is little room for money wage growth. Empirical evidence supports the existence of nominal rigidity.
I. Introduction
The system of wage setting in the Nordic countries is frequently regarded as highly centralised. However, wage setting takes place at two levels, nationally or by industry (for simplicity referred to as centralised) and at the firm level (wage drift). 1 Numerically, the two levels have been of about the same importance over the last three decades. This has led some observers to contest the picture of centralised bargaining. Jackman (1990) points out that the wage drift is so large as to suggest ''the possibility that centralised wage negotiations may be irrelevant to the final outcome''. Lindbeck (1990) and Skån-land (1983) argue that a two-tiered system leads to higher wages and lower employment than a system with wage setting at one level only.
In contrast, the view that wage setting is centralised is based on the idea that central wage setters take the expected wage drift into account in negotiations; see Hersoug, Kjaer and Rødseth (1986) . This view is based on three assumptions: 1) the central wage setters are able to predict the size of the wage drift in advance, 2) the wage drift does not completely offset the effect of central negotiations, 3) the expected wage drift is fully reflected in the increase negotiated at the central level (that is, the actual central increase is given residually from the target wage increase at central negotiations minus the expected wage drift).
The first of these assumptions seems fairly uncontroversial, and will not be the issue here. The second assumption, that wage drift does not offset the central agreement, is more important. In previous work, I have shown that in a theoretical bargaining model, the institutional feature that strikes and lockouts are prohibited during local negotiations (due to a peace clause in the central agreement), implies that there will be no such offset; see Holden (1989) . This prediction is supported by Norwegian data; Holden (1989) and Johansen (1995) . For the other Nordic countries, the evidence is less clear-cut, however, because most studies have been based on a Phillips curve approach, e.g. Flanagan (1990) , or used micro data where it is difficult to distinguish the effect of the centrally negotiated wage increase from the effect of outside wages, e.g. Holmlund and Skedinger (1990) . Using Swedish data, Hibbs and Locking (1996) , however, find that central wage increases have little offsetting effect on wage drift.
In this paper, I present evidence on the relationship between wage drift and centrally negotiated wage increases for aggregate manufacturing in the major Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The central increase appears to have only a small or no negative effect on wage drift for all countries.
The third assumption, that the expected wage drift is reflected in central negotiations, has been subject to less empirical research. Hibbs and Locking (1996) find empirical support for this view for Sweden. On the other hand, Flanagan (1990) concludes that drift and central increase are largely independent processes. Theoretical analysis of this relationship is also scant; exceptions are Holmlund (1986) , Holden (1988) and Moene, Wallerstein and Hoel (1993) .
The present paper investigates the relationship between wage drift and central negotiations within a strategic bargaining framework, and shows that in general the expected wage drift is fully reflected in central negotiations. However, the institutional framework of the wage setting system (in particular the legal status of a nominal wage contract even after the contract period has expired) may under certain circumstances lead to higher total wages in a two-tiered system than what they would have been in a system with only central wage setting. This reflects the hypothesis of Holden (1991) and Calmfors (1993) that whether a system with two-tiered wage setting, such as the Scandinavian, works like a system with only central wage setting depends on the rate of productivity growth and the rate of international inflation; see also Rødseth (1985) . Basically, the argument is that when there is little room for money wage growth at central negotiations, due to a large expected wage drift compared to the growth in ''target'' money wages, downward nominal rigidity at central negotiations may make wage restraint difficult. More recently, a related view is expressed in OECD Economic Surveys for Finland (1996) and Sweden (1997) ; according to the latter (p. 80) ''in the disinflationary climate of the 1990s, real wages have been much more rigid''.
The paper is organised as follows. The basic model is set out in Section II, followed by the theoretical analysis in Sections III and IV. Section V contains the empirical evidence on wage drift and the possible existence of a floor on money wages at central negotiations. Section VI concludes.
II. The Model
We consider an economy consisting of N identical firms, all producing the same good. The economy is completely open, so that the domestic price level P is exogenously given by the price level in the world market, adjusted for the exchange rate. There is one union in each firm, and at the central level there is a unions' and an employers' association. The sequence of moves is as follows. First, the centrally determined wage level W 1 ǹC is set in negotiations between the unions' and the employers' federations (where W 1 is the nominal wage from the previous year, and C is the change in the nominal wage that is agreed in the central bargain, both assumed to be the same for all firms). Second, the local unions negotiate with the management of the firms over local adjustments to the centrally agreed wage level (wage drift, D i ), so that the nominal wage to prevail in firm i is W i = W 1 ǹCǹD i . Third, each firm employs the number of workers necessary to supply the quantity that is demanded. All agents are assumed to have complete information.
The production function of the firms is assumed to be strictly concave, with employment as the only input. Labour demand and profits of firm i are thus decreasing functions of the real wage in the firm:
A local union's utility is assumed to be a function of the real wage level and the employment level of the firm, u i = u*(W i /P, L i ). Substituting out for
(1), we obtain union utility as a function solely of the wage level
Likewise, the utility of the unions' federation can be written as a function of the average real wage level,
, where L(W/P) is the average employment level (I only discuss symmetric equilibria, so there is no need to distinguish between average and total employment). The utility of the employers' federation is assumed to be given by the average real profits of the firms, (W/P).
III. Local Wage Bargaining
The wage drift 3 is given by the Nash bargaining solution
where i0 and u i0 are the respective disagreement points. As pointed out by Binmore et al. (1986) , the disagreement points are given by the parties' payoffs in case of a dispute. In the Nordic countries, the peace clause prohibits strikes and lockouts within the contract period of the central agreement. Yet workers may work less efficiently (work to rule), while the firm must pay the centrally agreed wage level W 1 ǹC. Thus the parties' disagreement points are functions of this wage level, i0 = 0 ((W 1 ǹC)/ P) and u i0 = u 0 ((W 1 ǹC)/P), where 0 0 and u 0 0. As workers reduce productivity during a work to rule, we have 0 ((W 1 ǹC)/P) ((W 1 ǹC)/P). We assume that the Nash product is single-peaked, so that a unique solution exists (this will hold for reasonable specifications of the functional forms). The first-order condition to (3) is
Since all firms are identical, the resulting wage drift will be the same everywhere. (If firms were different, the resulting wage drift would also differ among the firms. But Proposition 1 below would still hold.) Implicit differentiation of (4) with respect to C yields 1 N(W i /P)/NCǹ 2 (1/P) = 0. Note that Proposition 1 depends crucially on the specification of the disagreement point of the parties in local bargaining; see Holden (1989) and Moene et al. (1993) . If, in contrast to the assumptions here, the disagreement points of the parties were independent of the central wage increase, then local wage bargaining would result in a unique equilibrium wage level W, where the wage drift would be given residually, by what was necessary to reach this level. In this situation, central wage negotiations would be without importance for the actual wage level.
Whether the wage drift D is positive depends on which of the parties incurs the larger costs during a work to rule. Measuring utility in wage units, a work to rule can be defined as more costly to the firm than to the union if the following condition holds:
for W i = W 1 ǹC. If (5) holds, it can be seen from (4) that 0 for W i = W 1 ǹC, thus the solution to (4), D i , is strictly positive. The intuition is that the firm is willing to offer a nominal wage increase in order to prevent a costly dispute. It seems plausible to assume that a work to rule is more costly to the firm than to the union; even with bonus schemes or piece rates, workers usually have some choice in how to reduce productivity, and they will choose methods where the firm faces higher costs; cf. Moene (1988) and Holden (1989) . This is consistent with the fact that average wage drift in the manufacturing sector is strictly positive for all years and countries in my sample.
A special case is illuminating; assume that the workers are only concerned about wages, and that there are no bonus schemes, piece rates, etc. so that u(W i /P) = W i /P and u 0 ((W 1 ǹC)/P) = (W 1 ǹC)/P. Furthermore, during a work to rule, revenues R i are assumed to be a fraction ԡ (0, 1) of their normal value, so 0 ((
Substituting out in the first-order condition (4), we can solve for the resulting wage level (omitting subscript i as all firms are identical)
Thus there is no offset of the central wage increase, which has a unit coefficient on the actual wage level. (The wage drift is thus
IV. Central Wage Bargaining and Nominal Rigidities
To explore the possibility of nominal rigidities, we need a slightly richer model of wage bargaining than what is normally used. Three additional aspects need to be included. First, the model must allow for the fact that a strike is not an automatic consequence of a delay in reaching an agreement. Production may continue while the parties are bargaining; I refer to this as a holdout, following Cramton and Tracy (1992) . In the Nordic countries, as in most other European countries, it is a well-established practice that the terms of the old contract prevail during a holdout, even after the old contract has expired. (In Norway and Sweden, the parties are bound by law to observe the old contract, unless a work stoppage is initiated.) Second, even a very short work stoppage may involve non-negligible costs to the parties (fixed costs); see Holden (1994) . These costs may arise because the occurrence of a work stoppage may have an adverse effect on future cooperation between workers and firms, or an adverse effect on the reputation of the firm, thus reducing productivity/profitability in the future. (Other interpretations will be discussed at length below.) If a work stoppage has taken place during central negotiations, the payoffs of the parties when normal production is resumed are assumed to be (W/P)K, and v(W/P), where K0 are the costs induced by the work stoppage.
Third, in actual negotiations, it seems unrealistic that one party may put the opponent in a position where a work stoppage is initiated automatically unless an offer is accepted. To prevent this possibility in the model, it must be designed so that the opponent is always allowed to make the last offer before a player may initiate a work stoppage. To capture these aspects as simply as possible, we set up the model of central negotiations shown in Figure 1 . First, the employers' federation makes an offer, which the unions' federation may accept or reject. Acceptance ends the game, while upon a rejection, the unions are allowed to choose whether they want to strike. If they choose to strike, the remaining negotiations are modelled as a strategic bargaining model of the Rubinstein (1982) type; the parties receive (for simplicity) zero payoff until an agreement is reached, and they alternate in making offers. If the unions do not strike, they make an offer which the employers may accept or reject. Acceptance ends the game; after a rejection, it is the employers' turn to choose whether to initiate a lockout. If a lockout is chosen, the remaining negotiations are again modelled as a Rubinstein (1982) alternating offers model. If neither of the parties has chosen to initiate a work stoppage, there is a holdout until an agreement is reached. During a holdout, the players alternate in making offers, and their payoffs are given by the old contract.
The subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) agreement is reached by the initial offer of the employers. However, to find the SPE outcome, the game has to be analysed backwards. If a work stoppage is initiated, we have a standard Rubinstein game, and an immediate agreement will be reached. As shown by Binmore et al. (1986) , the outcome of the Rubinstein game is given by the Nash bargaining solution (assuming for simplicity that the players have equal discount factors). Thus, if a work stoppage has occurred, the outcome of the central bargaining is given by
C where D is expected wage drift, which is equal to actual wage drift given by (4), as perfect foresight is assumed. The first-order condition to (7) is
I assume that a unique solution exists, which will hold for reasonable functional forms. Note that the functions in (7) and (8) term in (8) may be reduced). 4 The intuition is that the wage setters take the expected wage drift into account, and modify the central increase accordingly to maximise the Nash product. The central wage increase is given by S = (W 1 ǹC S ǹD)/P, or equivalently,
If there is no work stoppage, the fixed costs are not incurred. Thus, the employers may pay a higher wage, and still obtain the same profit. Let this higher wage be E , given by (
In the appendix, I prove Proposition 2. There is a unique SPE real wage outcome (W/P)* in the twotiered system, given by
The central wage increase is given by C* = (W/P)*PW 1 D.
Thus, if (W 1 ǹD)/P E , the employers will use lockout threats to press wages down. If (W 1 ǹD)/P S , the unions use strike threats to raise wages. But there exists an interval [ S , E ], such that if (W 1 ǹD/P) is within this interval, none of the parties may credibly threaten to initiate a work stoppage, and no wage increase will be given in the central negotiations.
As the existence of this interval hinges on the assumption of fixed costs of a work stoppage, this assumption needs more discussion. First, observe that with straightforward modifications of the model, it can be shown that the qualitative results are the same even if the fixed costs are only incurred after a lockout (due to adverse effects on cooperation), and not after a strike. Likewise, the qualitative results do not hinge on whether the fixed costs fall on the firm only, or are shared by both parties. Second, note that if we extend the model slightly to allow for uncertainty, the fixed costs can be given a different interpretation. Assume that the bargaining outcome when a work stoppage has been initiated depends on the realisation of a random variable that is unknown to both parties ex ante, but which has a probability distribution that is common knowledge. This random variable may, for example, be the support/reaction of other agents (individual workers, local unions, employers, others) to the work stoppage. The expected wage outcome if a work stoppage is initiated is the same for both parties ( S ), but if the parties are risk averse, the employers will accept a higher wage with certainty, and the unions will accept a lower wage with certainty. The fixed costs may be interpreted as the amount that the parties are willing to give up so as to avoid risk; this argument is formalised in Holden (1998) .
In the comparison between a two-tiered system and a system with only central wage negotiations, I assume that the institutions governing the central negotiations are the same in both systems. Then the system with only central negotiations can simply be represented by setting D = 0 in Proposition 2.
Corollary. The relationship between the real wage outcome (W/P)
C in the system with only central negotiations and (W/P)*, is given by
The two systems give the same real wage outcome in interval (i) (lockout threats prevail in both systems) and interval (iii) (strike threats prevail in both systems). If neither of these cases apply (interval (ii)), the two-tiered system leads to higher real wages. In this case expected wage drift exceeds the target money wage growth, D/P S W 1 /P, so that there is no room for money wage growth at central negotiations. In other words, within this interval, wages are rigid in nominal terms at the central level, so that expected wage drift is not fully reflected in the central agreement. In a subcase of (ii), holdout threats prevail in both systems, and there is no offset of expected wage drift in the central agreement. (If firms were different, so that drift would vary among the firms, then the two-tiered system and a system with only central negotiations would generally result in different outcomes.)
V. Empirical Evidence
The investigation of whether wage drift offsets the central settlements is based on the following approach. First, I derive an empirical equation that may represent the wage outcome if the local wage negotiations were decisive in wage determination. Then the central increase is included in the equation. If the local negotiations really are decisive, the central increase should have no impact on the wage outcome, and thus obtain a coefficient of zero. However, if there is no offset of the central increase in the local negotiations, the coefficient should equal unity. Figure 2 displays the central wage increase and the wage drift for the Nordic countries. I have used a general-to-specific approach, starting out from a standard real wage equation, adopted from Nymoen (1992) :
where the i 's are constants, 1 denotes lagged one period, and the variables are (lowercase letters are used for variables measured in logarithms) w an index of money wages per hour for manual workers in the manufacturing sector (so w is central increase plus wage drift), T the employers' tax rate, q the value added deflator in manufacturing, p the consumer price index, y a productivity index (manufacturing) and U the rate of unemployment (in the estimations I tried both a linear and a loglinear specification of unemployment). (wǹTqy) and ( pq) are error correction terms, referring to the wage share and relative prices (the former should have a negative and the latter a positive sign). I then proceeded by successive exclusion of explanatory variables based on sign and statistical precision of the estimates, with the aim of obtaining a wellspecified and parsimonious empirical equation (see Table 1 ). Turning directly to the main issue, Table 2 presents the results from including the central increase in the empirical equations in Table 1 . For all countries, the coefficient of the central increase is significantly different from zero, and fairly close to unity (corresponding to the special case in equation (6) above). The high t-values indicate that the estimated coefficients are accurately determined. One should, of course, be cautious when interpreting this result, as there might exist other variables (e.g. expectations) that bias the coefficient. However, the general picture is the same when the central wage increase is treated as endogenous. These results clearly support the theoretical prediction that the existence of wage drift does not offset the outcome of the central agreement.
Now consider the second issue of the paper: to what extent is expected wage drift reflected in the central negotiations? A thorough empirical investigation of this issue appears very demanding, in part due to the crucial problem of obtaining a satisfying empirical specification of the expected wage drift. In the early stages of this work, I tried several alternatives, including actual wage drift (instrumented) and fitted values from various wage drift regressions. However, the results were in some cases extremely sensitive to the rather arbitrary choice of which specification to use. Thus, the empirical analysis reported here has a more limited focus, where the lack of a variable capturing the expected wage drift seems less important. As is apparent from Section IV, the interval (ii) where wages are higher in the two-tiered system arises as a consequence of nominal rigidity at the central negotiations. Thus, I tested for the existence of nominal wage rigidity at the central negotiations; a positive finding would suggest that wages at times will be higher in the two-tiered system.
Let me start by summarising the crucial elements of the theoretical results in Section IV that must be allowed for when investigating of the existence of downward nominal rigidity. In years where the nominal rigidity is not binding (denoted N for normal; corresponding to intervals (i) and (iii) in the Corollary above), the central wage increase is assumed to be given as a stable function of various economic variables (I return to which variables below). In years when this relationship results in a 'too low' wage increase measured in nominal terms (denoted R for rigid; corresponding Notes: T-values in parentheses, p-values in square brackets, subscript 1 denotes lagged one period, * indicates significance at 5 percent level, and the variables are (lowercase letters denote logarithms), w an index of money wages per hour, T the employers' tax rate, q value added deflator, p consumer price index, y productivity index and U rate of unemployment. Autocor. is a test for error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 2 (Harvey, 1982) ; ARCH is a test of autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (Engle, 1982) ; normality of residuals (Doornik and Hansen, 1994) . With the exception of the coefficient for U 1 for Sweden, none of the parameters is revealed as non-constant within the sample (Hansen, 1992) , and the corresponding joint parameter instability test is passed for all countries (see further description in the manual of PC-Give 8.0).
to interval (ii)), a holdout takes place, and nominal rigidity is binding. In the model of Section IV, the money wage then remains constant. However, in a more realistic model, a holdout need not always lead to constant nominal wages. First, if a holdout is costly to the firm, nominal wages will increase (cf. Section III). Second, the parties may agree on Pareto-improving modifications to the existing agreement, for example that working rules are modified to raise productivity, and higher wages are given in exchange. These aspects are likely to vary from year to year, but are probably not well captured by any variable that can be used in the estimation. Thus, when nominal rigidity is binding, I assume that the nominal wage increase is equal to a time-invariant rate of wage growth, plus an error term. We observe the central increase, but do not know which regime applies. 5 I want to test the null hypothesis that all years are normal, against the alternative hypothesis that nominal rigidity is binding in some years.
These considerations can be taken into account in a switching regression model, 6 where Notes: C/W 1 is the centrally negotiated wage increase relative to the lagged nominal wage level.
In the IV estimation, C/W 1 is treated as endogenous. Additional instruments used are (C/W 1 ) 1 , p 1 , q 1 , U 1 (Finland: y), y 1 , and dummy for first year of central agreement; for Denmark also q. Specification chi 2 is a test for the validity of instruments based on Sargan (1964) . In the IV estimation, the first observation is lost due to need for instruments. See also Table 1. and where X t and are vectors of explanatory variables and coefficients, respectively, is a constant, and at and bt are error terms, assumed to be independent of each other and over time, and jointly normally distributed with variances 2 a and 2 b . We observe C t , but do not know which of the mechanisms is binding. The likelihood of an observation (X t , C t ) is
where ( . ) and ( . ) are the standard normal distribution and density functions, and
. Within the model (10a)-(10c), the null hypothesis that all years are normal corresponds to the assumption that (10a) prevails in all years. As is apparent from (11), this hypothesis can be seen as implied by a parameter restriction to the general model (10a)- (10c), that = 100 (or an arbitrary large negative number), which entails that the probability that the normal wage setting (10a) prevails, (h):1. Thus, it is possible to test H 0 by a likelihood ratio test of model (10a) versus model (10a)-(10c).
To determine which explanatory variables to include for each country, I used a general-to-specific method for model (10a), starting out from the standard real wage equation (9), with the modification that the dependent variable is the central wage increase and not total wage growth. As above, explanatory variables are eliminated successively based on sign and statistical precision of the coefficient, until a parsimonious and empirically satisfying equation is obtained. This analysis was undertaken in PC-Give, without any allowance for possible nominal wage rigidity (i.e., model (10a) is viewed in isolation). The same explanatory variables were used in model (10a)-(10c), the additional elements to (10a) are the alternative mechanism (10b) and the procedure (10c). Undertaking the selection process without allowing for nominal rigidity is, of course, a valid procedure under the null hypothesis, with no nominal rigidity.
7
As discussed above, in the analysis here, the expected wage drift is never included. Thus, the equation should be thought of as a reduced form, where, say, the coefficient of unemployment includes both the direct effect of unemployment on the central increase and the indirect effect via the expected wage drift.
The empirical results of model (10a) and model (10a)-(10c) are displayed in Tables 3 and 4 . Again, I focus on the main issue, testing whether nominal rigidity has been binding. The results of the likelihood-ratio tests are shown at the bottom of Table 4 . The null hypothesis of no nominal rigidity is rejected for all countries, for Sweden at the 5 percent level, for the other countries at the 1 percent level. This lends support to the empirical relevance of interval (ii) (cf. the Corollary), where wages are higher in the two-tiered system than in a system with only central wage setting. The rate of money wage growth at which the downward nominal rigidity is binding varies among the countries from 1.5 percent in Denmark and Norway to 3.9 percent in Sweden (but with considerable year-to-year variation, as can be seen from the standard deviation in years when nominal rigidity is binding, b ). Figure 3 illustrates the results from the switching regression model in Table 4 by displaying the fitted values conditional on wage setting being normal ('cnor') and rigid ('crig'), in addition to the actual central increase ('cw1'); the additional letter, D, F, N and S, indicates country. Recall that 1962-1989 1961-1992 1961-1992 1961-1985 Notes: First year is a dummy for first year of the contract period of central agreement. None of the parameters is revealed as non-constant within the sample (Hansen, 1992) , and the corresponding joint parameter instability test is passed for all countries. See also Tables 1 and 2. the estimated probability that normal wage setting prevails in an observation (X t , C t ) is (h t ), where
, and where the parameter values are replaced by the estimated coefficients. Thus, the estimated probability that nominal rigidity is binding in a specific observation is greater than 50 percent if cnor is less than crig. For Denmark, this is the case in 1983, where the estimated probability that wage setting was rigid was 0.98; for Finland, the corresponding probability was 0.52 in 1991 and 0.65 in 1992; and for Norway, it was 0.92 in 1979, 0.63 in 1985, and 0.54 in 1991. For Sweden, the results indicate that nominal rigidity has been binding throughout most of the sample period, with only eight observations where the estimated probability of rigid wage setting is below 50 percent (cnorScrigS in 1965 (cnorScrigS in , 1970 (cnorScrigS in , 1973 (cnorScrigS in -75, 1979 (cnorScrigS in -1981 . This interpretation of Swedish wage setting may seem implausible; a related interpretation of the results would be that the switching regression model Table 3 ) minus log likelihood of model (10a)-(10c) (in Table 4 ). It has a chi 2 (1) distribution, where critical values are 3.85 (5 percent) and 6.63 (1 percent). See also Tables 1-3. captures the specific functional form, where wage growth is more sensitive upwards than downwards (so that under the appropriate circumstances, wage growth may easily become very high, while wage growth is less sensitive at lower levels). Note, however, that the fitted value representing normal wage setting, cnor, cannot be taken as an estimate of wage growth over the sample period if there were no nominal rigidities. For example, a 4 percent nominal wage reduction in Sweden in 1963 would have led to different values of the right-hand side variables in the subsequent observations, and thus led to different predictions in later years.
According to the theory model above, nominal rigidity will be binding in years when expected wage drift exceeds the target money wage increase. This aspect is difficult to evaluate without a satisfying empirical specification of expected wage drift. A possible way to proceed would be to undertake a detailed study, on an annual basis, of the economic situation at the time when central negotiations take place. This is an interesting avenue for future research, but it is outside the scope of the present study. 
VI. Concluding Remarks
Previous literature has argued that central wage setters may take the expected wage drift into account in central negotiations, and that the wage drift does not completely offset the outcome of the central negotiations. The present study provides empirical support for this view for the major Nordic countries. For all countries, there is little or no or no offsetting of the central increase in wage drift.
Theoretically, it is also shown that as long as there is room for a money wage increase at central negotiations, a two-tiered wage setting system works in the same way as a system with only central negotiations. However, if expected wage drift exceeds the target nominal wage growth (which, for example, could be the case in periods where low productivity growth and low inflation are combined with sizeable wage drift), a reduction in money wages in the central agreement may be required for the two systems to be equivalent. If nominal rigidity exists at the central level, the total wage increase can be higher in a two-tiered system than it would have been in a system with only central wage setting.
The possible existence of a floor on money wage growth in central wage negotiations receives considerable support in the empirical investigation. Within a framework of a switching regression model, the hypothesis of no downward nominal rigidity is rejected for all countries. The estimated floor on money wage growth varies among the countries from 1.5 percent in Denmark and Norway, 2.6 percent in Finland, to 3.9 percent in Sweden. For Sweden in particular, however, it may be questioned whether the results in fact indicate nominal rigidity, or whether they capture the functional form of the wage setting process.
The other variables are based on the OECD-CEP data set, from the Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, for Finland and Norway updated after 1988 using the same sources (exceptions are noted below). The OECD-CEP data set uses the following sources (for more details, see Centre for Economic Performance, Working Paper 118, 1991): p: Consumer price index from Economic Outlook Historical Statistics. T: Employment tax rate is employers' social security contributions as a share of compensations of employees less employers' social security contributions from the UN National Accounts Yearbook. y: Productivity index, for Denmark, Finland and Norway calculated from the index for industrial production in manufacturing and manufacturing employment from OECD-CEP, from OECD Main Economic Indicators, and the ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics; for Sweden, from Calmfors (1990, Figure 2a) . U: Unemployment rate whole economy, from OECD Labour Force Statistics.
Dummy for first year of central agreement: from Scheuer (1992) (for Denmark) and the country papers in Calmfors (1990) .
Proof of Proposition 2 (Sketch)
To find the SPE outcome, the game backwards has to be analysed backwards. If no work stoppage is initiated, the outcome of the bargaining is trivial. A holdout involves no cost to the parties compared to the old contract, so they will agree on a prolongation of the old nominal contract. C = 0, and the real wage outcome is (W 1 ǹD)/P.
If a work stoppage is initiated, there will (as analysed in the main text) be an agreement giving a real wage 
